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Introduction 
Culture substantially shapes peoples' understanding of the world. Perception about international 
security issues is no exception. Reality is rarely objectively observable, and indeed, in issues of 
national security, opacity is not only inadvertent but is often deliberately created. In such an 
issue-area, the propensity for even small biases to play a large role in shaping beliefs should be 
large. 
A large number of scholars, many of whom are involved in this project, have productively 
examined the role of culture in the study of national security affairs. In particular, the study of 
Chinese foreign policy has benefited from this approach significantly over the years, ranging from 
Alan Whiting’s early work to the contemporary work of Andrew Scobell and Arthur Waldron.  
This paper—drawing extensively on an ‘in progress’ book manuscript[1]—takes a different 
approach, focusing quite narrowly on one specific set of ideational factors: military doctrine. In 
particular, I evaluate the effects that Chinese military doctrine had in 1950 in shaping Chinese 
perceptions about American policy and signaling at the time in two different strategic geographies. 
In short, I argue that Chinese doctrine shaped Beijing’s perceptions of Washington in ways that 
the balance of power between the two does not satisfactorily explain. 
This paper attempts to make use of the self-conscious attention to positivist rigor that 
characterizes more recent scholarship on strategic culture.[2] However, it focuses on a narrower 
form of strategic culture than many other works. Johnston centers his definition of the term on 
beliefs regarding “the role of and efficacy of military forces in interstate political affairs.”[3] As will 
be clear below, the independent variable of this paper, doctrine or “theory of victory,” is used to 
describe beliefs at a different level, one closer to the operational art of military strategies and 
tactics. The usage in this paper more closely accords with that referred to by Scobell as the 
“organizational culture” of different national militaries.[4] 
This is clearly a much narrower form of “strategic culture” than that many other scholars find 
useful to study. Nevertheless, I think it is an important contribution to the literature for several 
reasons: 
1. First, I think the effects shown here are very clearly apparent in the historical record, not 
just for China but also for the United States and many other states.[5] Accordance with 
empirical reality must be the first criterion for assessing the utility of any theoretical 
construct.  
2. Second, I think such a narrow focus eases the task for objective coding of the cultural 
factor in question (military doctrine) and avoiding the critiques of circular reasoning and 
tautology that are often levied against similar arguments. That is, this work focuses on an 
aspect of culture that is clearly measurable in isolation from the effects it has on 
international behavior. Military doctrine is relatively easy to observe, even in closed 
societies like 1950s' China.  
3. Third, military doctrine is often relatively homogeneous. That is, there are rarely (although 
sometimes) multiple competing military doctrines within a single military organization. For 
training, procurement, and planning purposes it is important to have a relatively unified 
doctrine. This reduces the problems—faced by many other authors working on strategic 
culture—of multiple, competing cultural strands implying different lessons for 
perspectives on security.  
As a final introductory aside, the bane of any cultural argument in the study of politics is 
separating out the effect of material factors from those of a more ideational nature. This paper 
makes every effort to do this by highlighting deviations between doctrinal cultural shaped 
perceptions and reality—sometimes as manifested in military combat (an ultimate arbiter if there 
ever was one). 
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: 
1. First, a brief definition of terms will be offered and the theoretic predictions made explicit.  
2. Second, two cases of Chinese military statecraft from 1950 will be presented.  
3. Third, I go on to sketch out current Chinese doctrine and tentatively project the similar 
sorts of misperceptions that might lead to today.  
4. Finally, some notional conclusions will be offered.  
Hypothesis and Definitions 
This section first lays out an explicit definition of “doctrine” and where it comes from, and explains 
what implications come from viewing it as a form of culture. 
Doctrines and Theories of Victory 
Building on the usage of Posen[6] and others[7], this paper defines a “theory of victory” as a belief 
about what constitutes effective military power at a fundamental level and how it should be used 
operationally and tactically. It includes—indeed, is centered on—doctrine, but also consists of the 
make up of military forces as well as some elements of grand strategy. It is a blanket term to 
describe a generic understanding of how to win wars. It is a mental construct, albeit one that is 
often informed by past empirical experience and one that clearly has tangible effects on policy.  
This paper does not explain the sources of different theories of victory but rather their effects. 
That said, I recognize there is a large literature that is relevant here emphasizing the importance 
of systemic and geographic imperative[8], technology,[9] past historic practice,[10] and 
organizational structures and practice.[11] Here is it important to highlight that to the extent that 
the first two (systemic and geographic factors as well as technology) are of primary importance—
and to the extent that doctrine shifts smoothly in response to changes in either of those—then 
thinking of doctrine as a culture with independent explanatory power does not make sense. 
Rather, in those cases, doctrine would simply be a representation of underlying material factors. 
However, the bulk of the studies of doctrine have emphasized the latter two factors of historic and 
organizational practices. Thus, it is appropriate to focus on doctrine as a form of organizational 
culture, and of course, it is one that speaks to strategic issues directly. 
Predictions about the Importance of Doctrine 
If we view doctrine as a form of culture, then it as with any culture, can shape perceptions in 
critical ways.[12] By creating norms and expected patterns of behavior, culture profoundly shapes 
one’s understanding of reality. At a very fundamental level, “culture refers both to a set of 
evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or 
models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and 
interrelate.”[ 13] Military cultures are known to have important effects on grand strategic 
preferences.[14] Theories of victory are a sort of military strategic and doctrinal culture, and thus 
are likely to have their own effects on perceptions of power and signals.  
Regardless of its sources, the effects of the choice of a particular doctrine are wide-ranging. 
Future force procurement decisions will be made based on that decision. Training is geared to 
implement it (even at senior levels of the military). Political leaders will also be educated in it by 
the military leadership. Further, once incorporated into a nation’s doctrine, these beliefs are often 
applied to unexpected situations through the creation of standard operating procedures that are 
relatively inflexible yet widely applied.[15] Indeed, while military doctrine is necessary in order to 
rehearse and plan, once accepted it reinforces a belief system about its own efficacy.[16] This 
inflexibility of doctrine, coupled with its application to a wide range of policies and issues, 
emphasizes the importance of this ideational factor as a variable in and of itself.  
The use of military signals or statecraft to communicate regarding interests and capabilities often 
characterizes crisis diplomacy. I predict that the interpretation of the other side’s signals in 
international crises will be heavily shaped by a state’s own military doctrine. When a state 
interprets an adversary’s signal, it will do so by evaluating it through the lens of its own military 
doctrine. When a nation’s doctrine deviates from or oversimplifies reality as given by the military 
technology at the time, this interpretation will differ from that implied by the material (and 
technological) conditions themselves. These perceptions—or often misperceptions—are 
important in the conduct of international diplomacy. If states do not understand the distribution of 
power and the degree of adversary intent, inadvertent escalation and unnecessary military 
conflict are likely. In cases where combat is joined, we should see reality crashing into the blurred 
doctrinal lenses and shattering them. 
The paper now turns to two broad historical cases to probe the plausibility of the hypothesis. 
China’s Army Doctrine in 1950 and its Effects 
The first case examines Chinese doctrine as it pertained to ground combat and goes on to 
assess the degree to which it served as a cultural lens shaping Beijing’s perception of 
Washington in the summer and fall of 1950 as the Korean War escalated. Strong evidence is 
provided for the hypothesis proposed in the paper: Chinese doctrine leads to gross 
misperceptions about the degree of American intent and the effectiveness of American 
capabilities. 
Characterizing the Doctrine 
In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had just emerged victorious from two decades of 
civil war and a seven-year fight against Japan. These experiences left it with a robust set of 
strategic beliefs that it incorporated into its theory of victory: Mao downplayed the importance of 
nuclear weapons and emphasized the role of People’s War and infantry forces more generally.  
Mao’s well-known statements that nuclear weapons were mere “paper tigers” may have 
contained an element of bravado, but they also represented the views of senior Chinese military 
leaders to a great extent. For instance, in an internal debate in July 1948, Mao and Zhou argued 
for the weakness and irrelevance of nuclear weapons for important global security affairs.[17] 
Before 1955, there had been no formal study of what atomic weapons could do against China. 
Only in July of that year did the top 200 leaders in the CCP finally receive a briefing on the 
subject. Even this was only a scant 25 pages long, covering different aspects of nuclear war, 
such as what the weapons could do to cities, to forces in the field, etc.[18] The words of the 
acting Chief of Staff during the Korean War exemplified this in September 1950: “After all, China 
lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there?”[19] 
A second component of Chinese doctrinal beliefs was the emphasis of People’s War on morale 
and manpower over material. As Mao succinctly pronounced, “Weapons are an important factor 
in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive.”[20] Mao’s large, high-
morale forces would be used to concentrate large numbers of forces to overwhelm or annihilate 
entire enemy units. He wrote: 
In every battle concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and sometimes even 
five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them 
out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net.[21] 
Whitson and Huang’s The Chinese High Command, a definitive survey of the PLA, suggests that 
this particular pronouncement represented not only Mao’s strategic thought, but a consensus of 
the senior military leadership at the time.[22] This strategy had been used many times with great 
success during the civil war.[23] The west referred to it as a “human wave” or “human sea” 
tactic.[24] 
These doctrines were not just theoretical for the Chinese but were put into practice throughout the 
military. In terms of capabilities, the PLA was an exceptionally large, under-equipped force. One 
military analyst writes: 
In terms of equipment, the Chinese Communist Army of 1950 was primitive by any standards. It 
has been compared to an army of 1914, without the trucks and the artillery, primarily an army of 
infantrymen. There were few trucks, little artillery, very limited communication (particularly via 
radio), no air support, and no antiaircraft defense. Logistical support in the civil war had been 
provided by the local population.[25] 
The PLA’s doctrinal and strategic beliefs had many sources. Many of these elements can be 
pulled out of Sun Tsu and other sources of classical military thought in Chinese history.[26] More 
importantly, recent history reified these ancient themes. Many of these strategies had stood them 
in good stead against the better-armed and better-equipped KMT in the civil war.[27] These 
cultural views remained dominant in the PLA for years to come.  
China’s Army Doctrine Shapes its Perceptions 
When engaging in military statecraft with the United States in 1950, Chinese doctrine pervaded 
its perceptions. There is substantial evidence that the Chinese had a deep confidence that their 
doctrine would be effective against the American forces. For instance, a detailed assessment 
made by field commanders from late September 1950 makes apparent this confidence and does 
so by explicitly analyzing the situation using the doctrinal lens one would expect from a belief in 
People’s War. The following summary of that report, with a number of direct quotations from the 
actual document, merits reprinting at length: 
1. First, the U.S. forces were politically unmotivated because “they are invading other 
people’s country, fighting an unjust war, and thus encountering opposition not only from 
the American but other peace-loving peoples around the world,” whereas the Chinese 
forces would “fight against aggression, carrying on a just war, and thus will have the 
support of our people and other peace-loving peoples; and more important our troops 
have a stronger political consciousness and higher combat spirit.”  
2. Second, the U.S. troops were inferior in terms of combat effectiveness, because, 
“although they have excellent modern equipment, their officers and soldiers are not adept 
in night battles, close combat, and bayonet charges.” By contrast, the CCP troops “have 
had rich experience over the past ten years in fighting an enemy of modern 
equipment …and are good at close combat, night battles, mountainous assaults, and 
bayonets charges.”  
3. Thirst, the U.S. forces were not tactically flexible, since “American soldiers always confine 
themselves to the bounds of military codes and regulations, and their tactics are dull and 
mechanical.” On the other hand, the CCP forces were “good at maneuvering flexibility 
and mobility and, in particular, good at surrounding and attacking enemy’s flanks by 
taking tortuous courses, as well as dispersing and concealing [our own] forces.”  
4. Fourth, American soldiers were not capable of enduring hardship. “They are afraid of 
dying and merely relying on firepower [in combat, while] … on the contrary our soldiers 
are brave and willing to sacrifice life and blood and capable of bearing hardship and 
heavy burdens,” attributes that would remedy the disadvantage of inferior firepower.  
5. Finally, the U.S. forces had greater logistical problems. The U.S. was “carrying on a war 
across the [Pacific] Ocean and has to ship most of the necessities from the American 
continent—even if it can use supply bases in Japan, [for instance] it is transporting 
drinking water from Japan—and therefore its supply lines are much longer, eventually 
making it difficult for them to reinforce manpower and supplies.” Meanwhile, the Chinese 
would be close the rear bases and “back by [their] fatherland.” The organization of 
supplies would also be much easier; because “we have less trucks and artillery, we won’t 
consume that much gasoline and ammunition.”[28]  
In this passage, note in particular the references to U.S. military weakness due to numbers of 
troops, long supply lines, tactical inflexibility, lack of appropriate political motivation, and the 
dismissal of nuclear weapons. Conversely, the Chinese side was thought to benefit from the 
justness of its cause, their ability to move on foot, their aptitude for hand-to-hand fighting, and 
their light logistics tail. The Chinese military doctrinal lens clearly shaped both those perspectives. 
Other instances of relative Chinese confidence abound. One of Mao’s generals later wrote of the 
perceptions at the time:  
During the past several decades, our army had always defeated well-equipped enemies with our 
poor arms. Our troops were skillful in close fighting, night combat, mountain operations, and 
bayonet charges. Even though the American army had modern weapons and advanced 
equipment, its commanders and soldiers were not familiar with close fighting, night combat, and 
bayonet charges.[29] 
The Chinese expected bayonet charges to play a large role in the hypothetical next war; the 
United States thought that in general strategic bombing and nuclear exchanges would be central. 
Again, this is precisely what the hypothesis would predict: Each side should believe that factors 
emphasized by their own theory of victory would dominate in battles. 
A second element of China's confidence in their forces’ ability to fight the Americans came on the 
issue of nuclear weapons. Once the Korean War broke out, a wide range of Chinese leaders 
continued to express confidence in their ability to address this potential threat. As the two sides 
were edging toward conflict, the United States sent a number of subtle nuclear threats.[30] 
However, these threats by no means cowed the Chinese. At a meeting of the commanders at 
divisional level and above of the Northeast Military Region on August 13, 1950, one senior 
participant recalled that the military leaders relied on international popular opposition to prevent 
the United States from using the weapons: 
We then explicitly assessed the factor of nuclear weapons and concluded that it was men, not 
one or two atomic bombs, that determined the outcome of war. And an atomic bomb use on the 
battlefield would inflict damage not only on the enemy’s side but also on friendly forces. 
Furthermore, the people of the world opposed the use of nuclear weapons; the United States 
would have to think twice before dropping them.[31] 
Such thinking seems more appropriate for pacifist idealists and political propagandists than for 
hard-nose military line unit commanders. Internal briefing papers were making similar points in 
November: 
The atomic bomb itself cannot be the decisive factor in a war … the atomic bomb has many 
drawbacks as a military weapon … it can only be used against a big and concentrated object like 
a big armament industry center or huge concentration of troops. Therefore, the more extensive 
the opponents’ territory is and the more scattered the opponents’ population is, the less effective 
will the atomic bomb be.[32] 
A later discussion held by operational military commanders toward the end of the war was 
similarly Panglossian and simplified.[33] 
Chinese (Doctrinally Shaped) Perceptions Proven Wrong  
All of this might be explained away as a set of accurate perceptions given the strategic realities 
that China faced at the time. However, after the United States joined the conventional battle, a 
number of instances when the Chinese express surprise suggest that their perceptions were 
indeed “misperceptions.” The shock shown at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic—in 
China comes up repeatedly and strongly in the historic record. 
The Chinese soon found that the difficulties in surrounding and wiping out large enemy units—the 
primary operational doctrine for the PLA—were pronounced. American tactical mobility and the 
substantial firepower available even to small American units caused these problems for the 
Chinese.[34] Once the U.S. forces had been found and fixed, the Chinese forces still had trouble 
destroying them (which they had been able to do against similarly engaged Japanese or KMT 
forces). “Luring them in deep” was not effective when “they” could then set up hasty, but strong, 
defensive positions from which they could easily hold off the ill-equipped Chinese forces.[35] 
Peng Dehuai summarized the wide scope of problems that the Chinese forces faced at the end of 
the Third Campaign, in early January 1951:  
By now the Chinese People’s Volunteers had fought three major campaigns in a row in severe 
winter after their entry into Korea three months before. They had neither an air force nor sufficient 
anti-aircraft guns to protect them from enemy bombers. Bombed by aircraft and shelled by long-
range guns day and night, our troops could not move about in the daytime. And they had not had 
a single day’s good rest in three months. It is easy to imagine how tired they were. As our supply 
lines had now been extended, it was very difficult to get provisions. The strength of our forces had 
been reduced by nearly 50 percent due to combat and non-combat losses. Our troops badly need 
reinforcements and rest and reorganization before they could go into battle again.[36] 
The PLA had not expected to face such a capable military, as the paper’s hypothesis would 
predict. This provides powerful evidence that in this case the ideational factors were sharply at 
odds with the material ones. 
China ’s Navy Doctrine in 1950 and its Effects 
Amphibious operations in the same period present a different sort of case to examine through the 
lens of doctrine as strategic culture. In this case, the misperceptions relative to an objective reality 
are less sharp, but nonetheless the study emphasizes the close linkage between doctrine and 
perception. 
Characterizing the Doctrine 
In contrast to the backward PLA ground force (that is, the Army per se), for idiosyncratic reasons 
the Chinese Navy was relatively modern. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (the PLAN), as it 
was officially known, was relatively professionalized and technically advanced, at least in 
comparison to the PLA ground force. There were two main sources for the leaders in this service: 
graduates of Soviet training academies and KMT defectors. Many of the defectors had even been 
trained in the West, underscoring their familiarity with the American way of war. These former 
KMT officers were well versed in modern amphibious operations, and provided a core of 
expertise for the PLAN to refine. The Nationalist Navy had conducted unopposed amphibious 
landings numerous times, including a major operation in August 1947.[37] As the civil war turned 
against the Nationalists, their navy conducted a series of amphibious extractions, often while the 
ground element was under attack, a particularly challenging tactical situation.[38] 
Beyond these background conditions, the Chinese communist leadership had recently learned 
quite a bit in this area against a relatively advanced foe. Its attempts to conquer the small coastal 
islands of Jinmen, Zhoushan, and Dengbu in late 1949 had led to abysmal defeats. These 
setbacks taught the Chinese many doctrinal lessons about the conduct of such landings.[39] For 
instance, they began to focus on providing the troops with specialized training for amphibious 
landings, something prior Chinese operations had lacked. Soon they would be using translated 
U.S. Marine amphibious warfare manuals.[40] At this point, the Chinese communists were using 
regular Army divisions rather than dedicated marines, just as the United States had occasionally 
done in WWII.[41] From their prior defeats, “they again learned that without the support of regular 
navy ships, landing operations by small boats could be disastrous.”[42] They prepared to remedy 
this problem as well. Further, these defeats had also emphasized the importance of follow-on 
logistics support.[43] There, the key lesson of the importance of controlling the sea to prevent the 
opposing navy from attacking or reinforcing was emphasized.[44] 
Over time, the PLA had internalized many of the lessons from these earlier campaigns. The 
diligence and dedication following their earlier defeats allowed them to win a resounding victory 
on Hainan against a substantial and determined KMT force including a significant naval squadron. 
As the Chinese looked forward to the invasion of Taiwan, they recognized “victory would depend 
on cooperative operations of the three services.”[45] They also knew they could draw on units 
that were now experienced in conducting successful amphibious assaults against an opposed 
coastline.[46] 
The Effects of China’s Naval Doctrine 
This naval doctrine is relevant to the Chinese decision to postpone their plan to invade Taiwan 
following the American declaration of the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet. 
Separating out the material factors (i.e., the balance of forces) from the doctrinal cultural one is 
less clear in this case to be sure. However, in an objective military sense, the “deployment” of the 
Seventh Fleet was less strong that it might have appeared. For a month, there was a single show 
of force by a carrier and a series of air patrols. After that only a small fleet was deployed, and it 
was frequently pulled to Korean waters—days away from the Strait—to support the war effort 
there. Beyond that, U.S. military leaders repeatedly expressed concern throughout the fall that 
they would be unable to stop a significant Chinese attack. 
There is limited information available about the Chinese interpretation of this deterrent threat. 
However, their response was immediate: the declaration of the deployment of the Seventh Fleet 
caused the Chinese to abandon their plans. Following the announcement of the 7th Fleet 
deployment, a number of orders were issued immediately in Beijing to push back the invasion of 
Taiwan. On June 30, just over two days after Truman’s declaration, Zhou Enlai ordered “the date 
for the invasion of Taiwan to be postponed. The army should continue to demobilize, and the 
establishment of the air force and navy should be strengthened.”[ 47] The formal order from the 
Central Military Commission to relocate troops that had previously been slated for the invasion of 
Taiwan was issued on July 7.[48] In early August, they were shifted northeast where they would 
participate in the Korean intervention.[49] Also in early August, the CMC gave its formal approval 
to an extended delay, postponing the invasion until after 1951.[50] 
In terms of detail on why this decision was taken, it is clear from several other pieces of evidence 
that the Chinese leaders found the American threat to be both credible and very capable. For 
instance, while the 3rd Field Army had prepared hard for the invasion, the top political leadership 
of the PRC quickly recognized a need to abandon these plans:  
However, in an internal directive, the Central Committee [of the CCP] had to admit: it [China] did 
not have the ability to compete with the United States in a trial of modern navies.[51] 
Similarly, a tantalizing report regarding the reaction in Beijing to the American deterrent threat 
comes from a Chinese Nationalist agent who reportedly attended a high level meeting in Beijing. 
He passed on the conclusion of the senior Communist cadres, that the Chinese assault fleet 
would “last only a few [hours] against 7th Flt and U.S. Air Force.”[52] 
In both of these pieces of data, the specific dangers posed by the U.S. Navy (and in one case, 
the Air Force) are tied to the decision to postpone the attack. Thus, the Chinese understood that 
even a minimal deployment would decimate any prospects for a successful invasion. In this case, 
then, the Chinese doctrine led them to emphasize the strong capabilities of their adversary, 
perhaps even beyond what an objective reading of the situation might have suggested.  
Chinese Doctrine Today 
Taking the insights from the two case studies offered above, we can now assess the prospects 
that modern Chinese doctrine might shape its perceptions and thus lead to misperceptions 
Characterizing Chinese Doctrine 
Chinese military doctrine today is multifaceted and certainly in flux.[53] However, we might draw 
out a few notional strains for the purposes of this essay. The most important of these might be 
characterized as asymmetric doctrine, aimed at finding key vulnerabilities in American forces. 
Beyond that, nuclear doctrine will be discussed briefly.  
Overall, American capabilities (and technology in particular) remain very substantially ahead of 
China’s.[54] However, a number of prominent sources suggest that China is engaged in a 
deliberate effort to develop asymmetric strategies that might be used in a coercive manner to 
counter current American conventional dominance.[55] The extensive discussions of so-called 
Assassin’s Mace (shashou jian) strategies and weapons most clearly exemplify this.[56] 
Weapons do not determine doctrine, but they do signify priorities in Chinese doctrinal thinking. 
Notable among the recently obtained weapons for the PLA are the heavy missile destroyers (the 
2-4 Sovremenny-class DDGs) and advanced diesel submarines (the 4-12 Kilo-class SSKs), both 
imported from Russia. Both of these are systems that seem designed to penetrate the defenses 
of carrier battle groups that the Aegis missile defense platforms provide (Arleigh Burke-class 
DDGs and Ticonderoga-class CGs).[57] Similar points might be made regarding the SU-30 
fighters (long range strike fighters aimed to hold at risk American carrier-based air assets) and 
the substantial modernization (including accuracy improvements) and build up of ballistic missiles 
(e.g., hundreds of M-9/11 missiles that can be used to threaten Taiwan; MaRV systems aimed to 
defeat American NMD systems; etc.) 
All of these systems would be used in a relatively tactically offensive manner, attacking what are 
perceived to be key centers of gravity for America (and in some cases Taiwan). In most cases, 
the use of such systems would have to be conceived of in coercive terms: the threat of their 
existence will lead to their utility in deterring U.S. involvement.[58] This might be contrasted with a 
strategy aimed at more completely defeating a potential adversary (which the PLA recognizes 
would be beyond its means).  
On the nuclear side, China is clearly undergoing substantial modernization of both its missiles 
and warheads.[59] This currently includes the development of road-mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs far 
less vulnerable to a “bolt from the blue” first strike than the currently fielded systems. Additionally, 
and further out in the future, the Chinese are developing a more reliable SSBN (the so-called 
Type-94 project) and associated long-range, sea-launched, ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, the 
core doctrine underlying China's force posture has remained fairly consistent: minimum 
deterrence.[60] This is generally described as a retaliatory, no-first use doctrine that aims solely 
to deter nuclear attack on China and a belief that small numbers of deliverable warheads are 
sufficient for this task. According to Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu of the Academy of Military 
Sciences: 
Chinese strategists take the concept [of minimum deterrence] as a relative one, defined not only 
by pure numbers, but more importantly by such key criteria as invulnerability of nuclear forces, 
assurance of retaliation, and credibility of counter-attack. When a Chinese document says that 
China intends to possess nuclear weapons only at the minimum (or lowest) level for the needs of 
self-defense, that means to have the minimum but assured capabilities for a retaliatory second 
strike.[61]  
That is, given a degree of reliability in the security of a second strike, the overall size of the 
arsenal (critical for most warfighting doctrines) need not be increased. 
Prospects for Misperceptions Due to Modern Doctrinal Culture 
Extrapolating the lessons of the first two cases forward to today, what do these two facets of 
current Chinese doctrine imply for the ability of Beijing to evaluate signals from the United States 
and the overall balance of power? In both the conventional and nuclear arenas, the Chinese 
doctrine is substantially different from that of the United States. This will make it rather 
challenging for the Chinese to correctly interpret American signals.  
For asymmetric “Assassin’s Mace” strategies, the “asymmetry” is explicitly defined relative to the 
U.S. strategy. Thus, by definition it is a doctrine (or theory of victory) very different from that of the 
United States. This will have the effect of making communication of military threats more difficult 
for both sides. Washington deploys force and projects power by fielding well rounded, balanced 
forces whose aim it is to dominate a particular region for a sustained period, rather than getting 
off a few quick devastating strikes to deter an adversary from continuing a course of action. This 
is a pronounced contrast with the Chinese view as characterized above. 
One important mitigating factor in this arena is the very focus in the development of Chinese 
asymmetric strategies on contingencies for use against American forces. This might reduce the 
challenges posed by such large doctrinal differences. That said, a doctrinal culture is likely to 
emerge and harden over time, leading to excessive confidence in the strategies practiced and 
employed by the PLA. This will make the conduct of military statecraft more challenging.  
While there is significant evidence that the Chinese did find the American deployment of carrier 
battle groups to the Taiwan Strait region in 1995/96 to be a strong signal,[62] the evidence is not 
entirely clear, with many characterizing Beijing’s view of the crisis overall as “successful” from its 
perspective.[63] Regardless of which of these views is correct, the shifts in Chinese doctrine 
described in the previous section are precisely in response to that crisis, and thus followed it. It 
will be in the future that larger misperceptions should occur. 
Nuclear issues likely present a similar set of issues. As American doctrine continues to evolve 
along the lines implied in the Nuclear Posture Review, the potential for nuclear forces to be more 
integrated with conventional forces seems likely.[64] Given the Chinese doctrinal view on the 
limited tactical utility of such weapons, they are not likely to understand the enhancements to 
capability that such weapons might provide for U.S. military forces.  
The dangers here are that Washington and Beijing will not understand the overall balance of 
power and the degree of intent communicated by military signals when the other side’s doctrinal 
culture or theory of victory is different from its own.  
Implications  
This paper has shown that narrow views of strategic culture—here examined as military 
doctrine—can contribute to our understanding of important events in international politics even 
beyond what we can explain through an analysis of military capabilities alone. The role of 
Chinese over-optimism in the first case is critical to the development of the Korean War. In 
contrast, the degree of realism that comes from less radical doctrine in the naval case from 1950 
leads to an important “dog that did not bark” in the avoidance of war in the Taiwan Strait. The 
description of Chinese doctrine today suggests we should be concerned about several 
misperceptions and that Washington needs to carefully tailor its signaling with that in mind.  
This paper’s conclusions are particularly relevant today for two reasons. First, in the context of 
the ongoing military transformation or revolution in military affairs (RMA), it is likely that major 
militaries in the world today will face off with radically different doctrines. The U.S. theory of 
victory increasingly emphasizes a number of exotic technologies: precision guided munitions, 
space-based intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, information warfare, stealth, heavy 
strategic bombers, standoff weaponry, “total battlespace awareness,” and systems integration. 
However, when the United States sends deterrent or compellent signals relying on the threat or 
actual use of this sort of military power, it should avoid assuming that its adversaries will view 
American forces as Washington does.  
Many students of strategic coercion preach similar general lessons to those that this paper 
counsels.[65] For instance, Keith Payne’s recent examination of deterrence policy with the post-
Cold War era in mind concludes: 
That solution [to the problems posed by post-Cold War deterrence] is to examine as closely as 
possible the particular opponent’s thinking—its beliefs and thought filters—to better anticipate its 
likely behavior in response to U.S. deterrence policies, and structure those policies 
accordingly.[66] 
However, the existing work on “putting yourself in your adversary’s shoes” generally focuses on 
considering his national interests. How important is a specific piece of territory to him? Would a 
particular concession be difficult to make? This project points out that this is insufficient. This 
paper contributes to the points made on mirror imaging in general by providing specific evidence 
of this phenomenon, locating it in one very important issue-area, and explaining why it occurs by 
making explicit its causal mechanism. Policymakers need to understand how their adversary 
assesses power, which requires understanding the cultural perspective provided by his military 
doctrines, his theory of victory.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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